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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the underpricing of real estate investment trust
(REIT) initial public offerings (IPOs) from January 2010 to June 2015, as the sector recovered from the global
financial crisis.
Design/methodology/approach – This study analyses the first day returns of US REIT IPOs in the post
financial crisis period. The study then employs regression analysis to examine the factors that influence
IPO underpricing.
Findings – The study observes that underpricing, on average, is not significantly different to zero.
Furthermore, the REIT IPOs examined display underperformance in the longer term. In contrast to the earlier
data samples of Chen and Lu (2006), the authors do not find that underwriting costs are a direct substitute for
the indirect cost of underpricing, instead the authors find that higher underwriting costs are associated with
higher underpricing. Also in contrast to the mainstream underpricing literature, the data suggest larger
capital raisings require higher underpricing. The authors also find that newly listed REITs provided
significant excess dividend returns over the post-listing period.
Practical implications – For institutional and retail investors, the results will help to further inform
investment opportunities in REIT IPOs.
Originality/value – This paper adds to the ongoing academic debate of the lack of underpricing in
REIT IPOs relative to industrial companies. Research has shown periods of underpricing are often
replaced with periods of overpricing suggesting that the pattern of behavior in REIT markets is
substantially different.
Keywords USA, Financial crisis, REITs, IPOs, Underpricing, Real estate investment trusts
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
The issue of the underpricing outcomes of initial public offerings (IPOs) has
been the focus of much debate. Chan et al. (2009) refers to the “pricing puzzle”
that characterizes the disparity between offering prices and clearance prices at the close
of the first day of trading. The practice of underpricing is a common feature of IPOs.
As the issuer has underpriced, the subscribing investor is deemed to have made a
positive theoretical first day return by subscribing to the IPO. Research into IPOs
initiated by industrial companies suggests that there are substantial gains to be made
by subscribers. A summary of international underpricing studies on industrial
companies, Loughran et al. (1994, updated to February, 2015), reports average first day
returns in the USA at 16.9 percent, UK at 16.0 percent and China at 118.4 percent.
These are significant short-term returns by any measure. The country list goes
on to report that every country has, on average, positive first day returns to
subscribing investors.
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However, outcomes in property markets do not necessarily reflect the trends of
the industrial sector. Periods of underpricing are often replaced with periods of
overpricing suggesting the pattern of behavior in real estate investment trust (REIT)
markets is substantially different. Chan et al. (2013, Table I) review of studies of US REITs
and highlight the disparity of results across time. For example, Wang et al. (1992)
using data from 87 REIT IPOs during 1971-1988, found average first day returns to be
−2.82 percent. In contrast, Ling and Ryngaert (1997) studied 85 REIT IPOS between
1991 and 1994 and found a significant + 3.60 percent underpricing. Chen and Lu (2006)
looking at the period 1990-1999 confirmed this trend and found a significant +4.3 percent
return. Work by Ghosh et al. (2000), Buttimer et al. (2005), Dolvin and Pyles (2009),
Joel-Carbonell and Rottke (2009) and Bairagi and Dimovski (2011) continued to report
small, positive and significant first day returns (average 3-4 percent) with REIT IPO data
from 1990 to 2006. Chan et al. (2013) sum up the trends by concluding that average returns
were largely negative during the 1970s and 1980s, positive in the 1990s and early 2000s
becoming negative again in the late 2000s. The upheaval to financial markets triggered by
the sub-prime crises in late 2007, may have impacted on later results. The initial effect of
the global financial crisis (GFC) is assessed in more recent studies such as that by
Bairagi and Dimovski (2011). That study focused on the period 1996-2010 and captured
the immediate outcomes of the crisis. The current paper extends this research to consider
the longer-term implications of the recession and the slow recovery that followed.
No. of
obs
Mean first day
return (%)
Mean total capital sought
to be raised ($M)
Mean money
left ($M)
Positive first day
return (%)
Panel A: full sample
2010 9 −0.9 192.0 −0.9 55.5
2011 8 −2.8 261.3 −3.2 12.5
2012 8 +0.1 200.6 +1.6 37.5
2013 19 −0.3 264.5 +2.3 37.5
2014 6 +1.2 589.5 +23.7 66.7
2015 (to June) 6 +3.8 198.3 +13.8 66.7
2010-2015 56 +0.1 271.0 +4.4 41.1
Panel B: Equity REITs
2010 9 −0.9 192.0 −0.9 55.5
2011 5 −1.2 324.1 +0.5 20.0
2012 5 +2.5 231.5 +6.1 60.0
2013 13 +1.9 337.2 +6.4 46.1
2014 6 +1.2 589.5 +23.7 66.7
2015 (to June) 4 +5.7 254.7 +20.7 75.0
2010-2015 42 +1.2 320.1 +7.9 52.3
Panel C: Mortgage REITs
2010 0 – – – –
2011 3 −5.5 156.7 −9.4 0.0
2012 3 −3.8 149.2 −5.8 0.0
2013 6 −5.2 106.9 −6.5 0.0
2014 0 – – – –
2015 (to June) 2 −0.1 85.6 +0.2 50.0
2010-2015 14 −4.2 123.6 −6.0 7.0
Notes: This table reports the number of observations per year across the study period. The means for first
day returns, capital raised and money left are presented. The percentage of positive first day returns are also
reported. Panel A describes the full sample, while panels B and C present the Equity and Mortgage REITs
sub-samples
Table I.
REIT IPOs January
2010-June 2015:
returns, capital raising
and money left
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The financial crisis of 2007-2008 was followed by a serious recession in the
US economy. In the wake of the sub-prime crises, equity and property market indices
dropped dramatically around the world. In the USA, real GDP contracted from the fourth
quarter of 2007, reaching the trough in the second quarter of 2009 before commencing
a slow recovery. The United States Department of Labor shows that unemployment rose
from 5 percent in January 2008 to 10 percent in October 2009 (http://data.bls.gov/
timeseries/LNS14000000). By 2010, signs of recovery were underway (Bernanke, 2010).
However, the property sector lagged behind. The FTSE National Association of
Real Estate Investment Trust (NAREIT) index of total returns fell from 3,887 in
September 2007 to a low of 1,430 in February 2009. It did not return to comparable
pre-GFC levels until April 2011 (NAREIT, 2016a).
The purpose of this paper is to examine REIT IPO first day returns during the post-GFC
recovery period from 2010 to 2015. It is found that average first day returns are not statistically
significantly different to zero. This result empirically supports the model developed by
Chan et al. (2009) who argued that if REITs can sell their respective properties at a price similar
to the aggregated IPO price, there is no need for the REIT IPO to be underpriced.
We also find that larger REIT IPOs are more highly underpriced. This further supports
Chan et al. (2009) in that larger REITs might have had a wider distribution of firm value, or put
another way, may have fewer possible acquirers and hence may be more difficult to value.
A further finding, in contrast to Chen and Lu (2006), in this more recent period, is that higher
underwriting fees are associated with higher underpricing. We conjecture that more risky IPOs
require more underpricing and more risky IPOs will pay higher underwriting costs.
The asymmetric information hypotheses have been long standing theoretical
constructs applied both to the pattern of first day returns for industrial and REIT IPOs
(Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Baron, 1982; Rock, 1986). Regardless of whether the
subscriber expects the issue to be underpriced or whether the issuer or underwriter
knowingly underprice – underpricing is a given amongst industrial and mining company
IPOs, this may not necessarily be the case in property markets. Hartzell et al. (2006) posit
that REITs are easy to value due to their tangible assets and relatively transparent
structure. Sah and Seagraves (2012) argue that because REITs invest principally in large,
identifiable assets, face limitations on retained earnings and have limited intangible
assets, they may be more transparent than industrial firms. This increased transparency
should decrease the level of information asymmetry between management and investors.
Chan et al. (2013) argue that whilst the information asymmetry hypothesis may explain
the positive returns experienced by industrial firms, it does not account for the shifting
patterns evident in the REIT market.
In analyzing REIT IPO first day returns, it is the intention of this paper to make
an assessment of the characteristics that influence first day returns and help provide an
explanation of the returns experienced in the post-GFC environment. The structure of this
paper is as follows. Section 2 identifies the data sources and variables of interest. Section 3
reports the results of our analysis. Section 4 makes some concluding remarks.
2. Data sources and variables
This study examined 56 US REIT IPOs from January 2010 to June 2015. The sample
consisted of 14 Mortgage REITs and 42 Equity REITs. A total of 48 of the REIT IPOs
listed on the New York Stock Exchange, 5 on the National Association of Securities Dealers
Automated Quotations and 3 on the American Stock Exchange. The principal sources for
the IPO data were the NAREIT historical offerings records with prospectuses
(and prospectus data) sourced from Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval.
Over $15 billion of equity capital was raised from these 56 REIT IPOs.
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The study utilizes four dependent variables. The first is underpricing, or the subscribing
investor’s first day return (RETURN), defined as the first day closing price deducted
from the offer price and the result then divided by the offer price. The second dependent
variable is the market adjusted return (ADJRETURN), which is the RETURN adjusted
by the movement in the FTSE NAREIT All REIT index on the day of listing. If the first day
RETURN was 3 percent and the index movement was a positive 1 percent,
the ADJRETURN would be 2 percent. The third dependent variable is money left
(MONEYLEFT), or the number of issued shares multiplied by the difference between the
issue price and the first day closing price (or the total amount of money the issuer
has theoretically left for the subscribing investors). The fourth is a binary variable identified
by a 1 if subscriber’s theoretically made a positive first day return (POSRETURN) when
the first day closing price was higher than the offer price, or 0 if otherwise.
The study also examines the following variables as possible explanatory variables:
(1) Total capital sought to be raised (LNTOTAL or TOTAL as appropriate) and
implied market capitalization at the offer price (LNIMPCAP or IMPCAP as
appropriate). There are multicollinearity concerns between the total capital sought
to be raised and the implied market capitalization at the offer price so we run only
one of these variables at a time. Larger issues are likely to be made by larger firms
with more publicly available information about them and hence likely to have less
asymmetric information issues. It is expected that larger issues would have lower
underpricing (Gao et al., 2013; Ibbotson et al., 1994; Michaely and Shaw, 1994).
(2) An underwriter spread (UNDSPREAD) identified in the prospectus reflects a major
direct cost of the issue. Chen and Lu (2006) suggest gross spreads and first day
returns are substitutes for each other.
(3) The role of the industry dominant lead underwriter. Merrill Lynch (MERRILL) was
the underwriter that underwrote the majority of REIT IPO issues during the period
of this study. Chen and Lu (2006) suggest that they were the dominant underwriters
in this industry having underwritten most issues during 1980-1999. Bairagi and
Dimovski (2011) indicate the same for REIT IPO issues during 1996-2010.
(4) The influence of the industry dominant auditor, Ernst and Young (EANDY).
The impact of the main auditor on the level of underpricing amongst REIT IPOs is
investigated following Beatty and Ritter (1986).
(5) A distinction is also made between equity and Mortgage REITs (MORTREIT)
(Dolvin and Pyles, 2009; Ling and Ryngaert, 1997; Wang et al., 1992).
(6) Whether the structure involved an umbrella partnership REIT (UPREIT) (Ling and
Ryngaert, 1997).
(7) The price volatility of the REIT sector over the 12 months before listing
(12MNTHVOL). It might be expected that a historically more volatile market might
influence a higher underpricing.
(8) The POST11 variable is a binary variable recording a 1 if the REIT IPO occurred in
2012-2015 or a 0 if otherwise.
Following Carter and Manaster (1990), Ling and Ryngaert (1997) and Chen and Lu (2006) an
underwriter reputation binary variable reflecting the reputation rank of the lead
underwriter of 8 or more, was also considered and tested (sourced from Jay Ritter’s
homepage). However, it appeared to have multicollinearity concerns with the size of
the capital raising. Other considerations included; the listing exchange (Bairagi and
Dimovski, 2011); whether the REIT was externally managed (Chen and Lu, 2006) and the
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proportion of institutional holdings (Ling and Ryngaert, 1997). These were also tested
but found not to be significant.
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model was used for the first three dependent
variables, RETURN, ADJRETURN and MONEYLEFT. The model is as follows:
RETURN or ADJRETURN or MONEYLEFT ¼ b0þb1LNTOTAL or LNIMPCAPð Þ
þb2UNDSPREADþb3MERRILL
þb4UPREITþb5POST11
þb6MORTREITþb712MTHVOL
þb8EANDYþe (1)
where all the variables are as defined previously, the β’s are unknown parameters to be
estimated and ε is assumed ~ N (0, σ²).
The fourth model is a logit model on the binary variable positive first day return
(POSRETURN) regressing all the above explanatory variables again.
3. Results
Table I reports the broad trends for the REIT IPOs over 2010 to June 2015. The data is
partitioned into three panels reporting on the 56 IPOs, the 42 Equity REIT IPOs and the
14 Mortgage REIT IPOs for each year of the study. Table I indicates that the average first
day returns for the REIT IPOs were +0.1 percent over the whole period with an average of
+1.2 percent for Equity REITs and −4.2 percent for Mortgage REITs. The average first day
returns for Equity REITs were negative in 2010-2011 but positive over the remainder of
the study period. In contrast, Mortgage REITs experienced negative first day returns over
the full sample period. In terms of the “average capital sought,” Equity REIT IPOs were
generally substantially larger than MORTREIT IPOs. As for the “average money left”
per IPO, Equity REITs left approximately $7.9 million per IPO over the whole period.
However, 2010 was an exception in that (on average) Equity REIT IPOs did not leave money
on the table for subscribing investors. The Mortgage REITs IPOs, on average, did not leave
money on the table for existing subscribers, rather they took approximately $6 million
per IPO from subscribers over the whole period and took in every Mortgage REIT IPO but
one over the whole study period. (This reflects lower closing prices in aggregate compared
to offer prices in aggregate.)
In relation to subscribers, looking at simply “earning” a positive first day return rather
than the magnitude of the first day return, Table I shows only 52.3 percent of the Equity
REITs offered a positive return. Subscribers to the Mortgage REIT IPOs earned a simple
positive return in only 7 percent of the cases (1 in 14) during 2010-2015.
The years 2010 and 2011 point to a break in the pattern of results. During this period
negative average annual underpricing is evidenced. Generally, there is negative average
money left and only around one in three of the IPOs shows a positive first day return.
To further investigate this pattern of behavior the data were partitioned into two sub periods.
Table II divides the summary statistics for the REIT IPOs into two sub periods, 2010-2011 and
2012-June 2015. The first sub period shows an average first day return of −1.8 percent to
subscribing investors with only 35.3 percent of investors having made any sort of positive
first day return. The range of first day returns ranged from −7.9 to +7.6 percent. The latter
sub period shows +0.6 percent, on average, first day return to subscribing investors with
43.6 percent of investors having made a positive first day return. The average size of the
REIT IPO raisings were large at over $220 million per IPO in the first sub period and over
$290 million in the second. The underwriter spread averaged 6.2 percent in the first period and
nearly 6.1 percent in the second, while Merrill Lynch was the lead underwriter in about
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12 percent of the IPOs in the first period and over 15 percent in the second. Similarly Ernst and
Young was the nominated auditor in nearly 30 percent of IPOs in the first period and nearly
36 percent in the second. About 17 percent of REIT IPOs were Mortgage REIT in the first
period and around 28 percent in the second.
Table III reports the multiple OLS regression results between the first day returns and
the explanatory variables previously identified, utilizing the sample of 56 REIT IPOs during
2010-June 2015. There were no outlier observations that appeared to cause undue influence
on the results (we take this to be first day returns over 3.5 SD from the mean return).
Parameter estimates and p-values are reported while robust SE are employed.
Factors influencing the RETURN and ADJRETURN variables are analyzed in this
Table III. For robustness purposes, to view the impact of the size of the REIT on first day
returns we use LNTOTAL reflecting the natural log of the capital sought to be raised,
followed separately by IMPLNCAP reflecting the natural log of the implied (at the offer
price) capitalization of the REIT. The results of the regression suggest that both of these
measures influence first day returns during the whole sample period. This suggests
that larger REITs, making larger property purchases, have higher first day returns to
subscribing investors.
The UNDSPREAD variable is also positive and significant. This suggests that if the
underwriters perceive a higher risk about the investment, then subscribing investors take
this into account and require a higher underpricing return. Additionally, the positive and
significant POST11 variable suggests investors in REIT IPOs during 2012-2015 earned
higher first day returns than investors in 2010 and 2011 IPOs.
Mean SD Min. Max.
Panel A: 2010-2011 (no. of obs¼ 17)
RETURN (%) −1.811 4.261 −7.950 7.586
MONEYLEFT ($M) −2.008 9.841 −13.500 23.723
POSRETURN (%) 35.3 49.3 0.0 100.0
TOTAL 224.602 154.196 26.400 648.115
IMPMKTCAP 379.217 454.239 26.409 1,820.974
UNDSPREAD (%) 6.241 0.981 4.000 7.000
MERRILL 0.118 0.332 0.000 1.000
UPREIT 0.588 0.507 0.000 1.000
MORTREIT 0.176 0.393 0.000 1.000
VOLATILITY 6.534 3.055 2.980 12.705
EANDY 0.294 0.469 0.000 1.000
ADJRETURN (%) −1.118 4.558 −7.219 7.505
Panel B: 2012-June 2015 (no. of obs¼ 39)
RETURN (%) 0.632 5.412 −8.800 15.652
MONEYLEFT ($M) 7.231 21.677 −17.647 89.080
POSRETURN (%) 43.6 50.2 0.0 100.0
TOTAL 291.196 393.138 34.000 2,292.500
IMPMKTCAP 748.479 1,107.59 47.586 4,558.505
UNDSPREAD (%) 6.058 1.153 4.000 7.000
MERRILL 0.154 0.366 0.000 1.000
UPREIT 0.564 0.502 0.000 1.000
MORTREIT 0.282 0.455 0.000 1.000
VOLATILITY 3.960 1.100 2.694 6.378
EANDY 0.359 0.486 0.000 1.000
ADJRETURN (%) 0.825 5.412 −8.687 79.763
Notes: This table presents the summary statistics for the variables employed in the OLS regression models
for REIT IPOs. The variables are described in the data sources and variables section
Table II.
REIT IPOs 2010-June
2015, summary
statistics
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Table IV examines factors that might influence the RETURN and ADJRETURN variables
in 2012-June 2015 only. Larger REIT IPOs continue to show a positive and significant
influence on first day returns and there continues to be evidence that the direct cost of
underwriting is also associated with higher indirect cost of underpricing. This is in contrast
to the earlier data sample of Chen and Lu (2006) who report that underwriting costs are a
direct substitute for the indirect cost of underpricing. Both of these results are elaborated on
in the next section. In addition, there is some evidence to suggest that employing the
industry dominant auditor influences lower underpricing. This is consistent with Beatty
and Ritter (1986).
Table V reports the results for the factors influencing the money left in (the aggregate
measure of underpricing) by the REIT IPOs. Panel A confirms the POST11 variable
is positive and significant indicating that 2012-2015 was a different period in terms of more
money left on the table for subscribing investors. Not unexpectedly, larger REIT IPOs left
more money in aggregate.
Since the mean first day return is close to zero, from a subscribing investor’s viewpoint,
investing in REIT IPOs may be treated with some caution. Are there factors that might
improve the odds of a positive first day return? Table VI reports the odds ratio results of
a logit model examining factors influencing a simple positive return (recorded as a 1 if there
is any theoretical first day return). It is found that for the REIT IPOs in the overall period,
Coefficient ( p-value) Coefficient ( p-value)
Panel A: RETURN
Intercept −0.202 (0.015)** −0.236 (0.003)***
LNTOTAL 0.021 (0.005)***
LNIMPCAP 0.023 (0.002)***
UNDSPREAD 1.422 (0.052)* 1.734 (0.014)**
MERRILL 0.013 (0.595) 0.011 (0.640)
UPREIT −0.014 (0.266) −0.010 (0.407)
POST11 0.033 (0.008)*** 0.240 (0.043)**
MORTREIT −0.028 (0.135) −0.014 (0.457)
12MNTHVOL 0.069 (0.847) 0.045 (0.876)
EANDY −0.030 (0.075)* −0.030 (0.043)**
N 56 56
R2 0.450 0.469
Reset p-value 0.495 0.241
Panel B: ADJRETURN
Intercept −0.196 (0.023)** −0.229 (0.005)***
LNTOTAL 0.022 (0.005)***
LNIMPCAP 0.023 (0.001)***
UNDSPREAD 1.435 (0.059)* 1.749 (0.015)**
MERRILL 0.016 (0.574) 0.013 (0.607)
UPREIT −0.014 (0.310) −0.010 (0.451)
POST11 0.025 (0.099)* 0.016 (0.273)
MORTREIT −0.028 (0.134) −0.014 (0.445)
12MNTHVOL 0.015 (0.970) 0.041 (0.901)
EANDY −0.028 (0.131) −0.028 (0.088)*
N 56 56
R2 0.407 0.469
Reset p-value 0.224 0.081
Notes: The table reports OLS parameter estimates and p-values (in parentheses). N, the number of observa-
tions, R2 and Ramsey RESET test p-values are also reported. *,**,***Statistically significant at 10, 5 and
1 percent levels, respectively
Table III.
Factors influencing
first day return and
adjusted return of
REIT IPOs 2010-June
2015
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the larger the IPO, the higher the odds of subscribing investors making a positive return.
We also find for every additional percent higher underwriter spread, that there is a
significant 253 or 353 percent increase in the odds of these IPOs allowing subscribers to
make a theoretical positive first day return (depending on whether the capital sought to be
raised or the implied capitalized value of the REIT is used). However, in the more recent
2012-2015 data set only the size variable appears to be significant in improving the odds of a
positive first day return. This still remains an important finding. Previous research
suggested larger IPOs were less risky and required lower underpricing. This does not
appear to be the case with these more recent data.
Whilst the odds ratio results suggest that the size of the IPO has a positive impact on
underpricing, the puzzling question still remains. Why would an investor, or more
importantly, an institutional investor participate in REIT IPOs? In an attempt to answer
this question in more detail we examined the longer-term performance of these IPOs.
Following the research of Wang et al. (1992) and Chan et al. (2013) we calculated the market
adjusted total returns over the 6- and 12-month post IPO time period, commencing after the
first trading day. The market adjusted total returns was estimated by subtracting the FTSE
NAREIT All REITs total return from the IPO REIT total return over the two event periods.
The results are presented in panel A of Table VII. It can be seen that both the 6- and
12-month returns are negative but insignificant.
This result is in contrast to Wang et al. (1992) and Chan et al. (2013). Wang et al. (1992)
report negative and significant market adjusted total returns of −7.48 percent in the 189
Coefficient ( p-value) Coefficient ( p-value)
Panel A: RETURN
Intercept −0.191 (0.071)* −0.245 (0.022)**
LNTOTAL 0.027 (0.015)**
LNIMPCAP 0.028 (0.006)***
UNDSPREAD 1.408 (0.119) 1.878 (0.032)**
MERRILL 0.002 (0.957) −0.001 (0.987)
UPREIT −0.008 (0.631) −0.003 (0.836)
MORTREIT −0.029 (0.171) −0.009 (0.656)
12MNTHVOL 0.046 (0.953) −0.127 (0.874)
EANDY −0.031 (0.120) −0.035 (0.066)*
N 39 39
R2 0.426 0.486
Reset p-value 0.583 0.271
Panel B: ADJRETURN
Intercept −0.219 (0.048)** −0.268 (0.005)***
LNTOTAL 0.030 (0.010)***
LNIMPCAP 0.030 (0.001)***
UNDSPREAD 1.534 (0.099)* 2.007 (0.015)**
MERRILL 0.004 (0.892) 0.002 (0.607)
UPREIT −0.003 (0.880) 0.002 (0.451)
MORTREIT −0.028 (0.188) −0.009 (0.445)
12MNTHVOL 0.018 (0.982) −0.122 (0.901)
EANDY −0.036 (0.093)* −0.039 (0.088)*
N 39 39
R2 0.444 0.469
Reset p-value 0.472 0.085
Notes: This table reports OLS parameter estimates and p-values (in parentheses). N, the number of
observations, R2 and Ramsey RESET test p-values are also reported. *,**,***Statistically significant at 10, 5
and 1 percent levels, respectively
Table IV.
Factors influencing
first day return
and adjusted
return of REIT IPOs
2012-June 2015
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trading days after the IPO in their study of 87 REIT IPOs from 1971 to 1988. Chan et al. (2013)
also observe negative and significant adjusted total returns of −11.13 percent over a 189-day
event period in a sample of 321 REIT IPOs over the study period of 1971-2010. However,
Ling and Ryngaert (1997) find that 85 equity REIT IPOs significantly outperform over
100 trading days post the first day of trade by +2.2 percent during the study period of
1991-1994. Our findings support Chan et al. (2013) who suggest that there are significant
variations in the results depending on the period of study.
The purpose of the current study has been to make an assessment of the characteristics
that influence first day returns. Given the results discussed it was decided to investigate other
potential factors that may impact on outcomes. To this end, the dividend yields of the newly
listed REITs were examined. Prior REIT research suggests that REITs are generally considered
as defensive stocks and therefore provide diversification benefits (Glascock et al., 2004; Szu-Yin
and Glascock, 2008). Furthermore, due to their regulatory payout requirement, REITs provide a
stable income stream to investors (NAREIT, 2016b). Figure 1 displays the mean dividend yield
of the REIT IPOs portfolio and the FTSE NAREIT All REITs yields over the 6- and 12-month
post IPO periods. Figure 1 shows that the average yields of the IPO portfolio are higher than
the index yields across both the periods. The average 12-month dividend yield for IPOs
is 6.35 percent, compared to 4.39 percent for the index. Next, we calculate the market adjusted
dividend yields by subtracting the dividend return of each REIT IPO from the FTSE NAREIT
All REITs dividend yield over the corresponding period. The results are presented in panel B
Coefficient ( p-value) Coefficient ( p-value)
Panel A: 2010-June 2015
Intercept −13.674 (0.514) −6.567 (0.700)
TOTAL 0.031 (0.000)***
IMPCAP 0.008 (0.012)**
UNDSPREAD 92.893 (0.735) 77.238 (0.737)
MERRILL 13.143 (0.219) 20.193 (0.064)*
UPREIT −1.913 (0.639) −4.160 (0.336)
POST11 9.169 (0.011)** 7.675 (0.040)**
MORTREIT −6.918 (0.308) −7.907 (0.184)
12MNTHVOL 38.527 (0.660) 21.917 (0.806)
EANDY −9.432 (0.109) −11.263 (0.082)*
N 56 56
R2 0.563 0.486
Reset p-value 0.174 0.002
Panel B: 2012-June 2015
Intercept 0.985 (0.975) 8.655 (0.746)
TOTAL 0.032 (0.000)***
IMPCAP 0.008 (0.018)**
UNDSPREAD 42.970 (0.893) 68.563 (0.971)
MERRILL 11.624 (0.339) 20.155 (0.113)
UPREIT −0.321 (0.957) −4.825 (0.439)
MORTREIT −9.048 (0.263) −9.321 (0.184)
12MNTHVOL 24.043 (0.933) −129.177 (0.674)
EANDY −10.563 (0.124) −12.521 (0.098)*
N 39 39
R2 0.555 0.461
Reset p-value 0.515 0.026
Notes: This table reports OLS parameter estimates and p-values (in parentheses). N, the number of
observations, R2 and Ramsey RESET test p-values are also reported. *,**,***Statistically significant at 10, 5
and 1 percent levels, respectively
Table V.
Factors influencing
money left by REIT
IPOs 2010-June 2015
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of Table VII. It can be seen that the yields of newly listed REITs significantly outperform the
index yields over both the 6- and 12- month periods.
This outcome suggests that investors are prepared to forgo initial day underpricing
for higher income returns in the longer term. We acknowledge that the estimation of the
difference in yields has not been risk adjusted. It may also be the case that these outcomes
are an anomaly as a result of the sample period. We do, however, believe that this is an
area for future research and may shed light on the attraction of REIT IPOs and the
underpricing puzzle.
Coefficient ( p-value) Coefficient ( p-value)
Panel A: 2010-June 2015
Intercept 5.23e-9 (0.017)** 4.82e-9 (0.019)**
LNTOTAL 4.933 (0.020)**
LNIMPCAP 3.589 (0.015)**
UNDSPREAD 3.529 (0.047)** 4.535 (0.035)**
MERRILL 3.829 (0.252) 3.816 (0.238)
UPREIT 0.690 (0.645) 0.796 (0.782)
POST11 7.116 (0.110) 3.471 (0.275)
MORTREIT 0.465 (0.576) 0.675 (0.777)
12MNTHVOL 3.05e+ 13 (0.190) 3.47e+ 11 (0.303)
EANDY 0.325 (0.221) 0.332 (0.237)
N 56 56
LR p-value 0.002 0.001
Panel B: 2012-June 2015
Intercept 1.11e-7 (0.056)* 6.93e-9 (0.045)**
LNTOTAL 4.530 (0.049)**
LNIMPCAP 4.281 (0.034)**
UNDSPREAD 2.446 (0.161) 3.964 (0.110)
MERRILL 1.769 (0.630) 1.990 (0.558)
UPREIT 1.743 (0.631) 1.768 (0.614)
MORTREIT 0.437 (0.554) 0.845 (0.907)
12MNTHVOL 4.87e+ 25 (0.262) 6.69e+ 14 (0.503)
EANDY 0.460 (0.435) 0.318 (0.310)
N 39 39
LR p-value 0.020 0.020
Notes: This table reports the odds ratio estimates of factors influencing a positive first day return by
subscribers with p-values (in parentheses). N, the number of observations and LP p-values are also reported.
*,***Statistically significant at 10 and 5 percent levels, respectively
Table VI.
Odds ratio of
factors influencing a
positive return by
subscribers in REIT
IPOs 2012-June 2015
N Mean ( p-value) SD Min. Max.
Panel A: market adjusted total return (%)
6-month RETURN 56 −2.18 (0.261) 14.52 −30.92 33.42
12-month RETURN 50 −4.23 (0.162) 21.40 −48.56 55.06
Panel B: market adjusted dividend yield (%)
6-month DIV YIELD 56 +0.88 (0.001)*** 3.47 −2.19 +22.17
12-month DIV YIELD 50 +1.96 (0.000)*** 4.54 −4.39 +16.32
Notes: Panel A of this table reports the market adjusted total returns (inclusive of dividends) for REIT IPOs
from 2010 to June 2015. Panel B presents the market adjusted dividend yields for REIT IPOs from 2010 to
June 2015. ***Statistically significant at 1 percent level
Table VII.
Long-term
market adjusted total
returns and dividend
yields in REIT IPOs
2010-June 2015
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4. Discussion and conclusions
The study undertaken contributes to the body of knowledge on the underpricing results
of REIT IPOs by considering the pattern of behavior of US REITs as the market recovered
from the great recession. In undertaking the investigation, the researchers have also sought
to make an assessment of the extent to which theoretical explanations contribute to
our understanding of market trends between 2010 and 2015. REIT IPOs do not display
significant average first day returns. This suggests that there is not a great deal
of uncertainty about their valuation. It adds empirically to the model developed by
Chan et al. (2009) suggesting that REIT IPOs do not necessarily need to underprice their
offerings if they can sell the properties at a price similar to the IPO price itself.
The results do not support the asymmetric information hypothesis in respect to
the underpricing of REIT IPOs during the period 2010-2015. In contrast to the mainstream
underpricing literature, our data suggest larger capital raisings required higher underpricing.
The mainstream underpricing literature generally examines small and large IPOs while REIT
IPOs are mostly all fairly large (a few in the tens of millions, most in the hundreds of millions
of dollars), so these are already more likely to have a great deal of publicly available
information about them, reducing asymmetric information concerns. The larger issues,
may have a wider distribution of firm value and hence an influence on the underpricing
of the IPO. Given the turmoil in post-GFC real estate markets, this lends support to the
argument put forward by Chan et al. (2009) that larger REITs and those that raised more
equity might well have had a wider distribution of firm value. This is in line with the Beatty
and Ritter (1986) argument that lower uncertainty about the value of an IPO reduces the
“need” for underpricing.
It was also found that underwriting costs were not direct substitutes for underpricing.
Rather higher underwriting costs (reflecting the riskiness of the success of the capital raising)
were associated with higher underpricing (reflecting higher uncertainty about the value of the
IPO). This suggests the risks perceived by underwriters with the success of the capital raising
of the issue may be interpreted as risks perceived with the value and pricing of the issue itself.
This outcome differs from the earlier data samples of Chen and Lu (2006).
Clearly, the years following the GFC appear to have added another dimension to the
underpricing of REIT IPOs. REIT IPO issuers continued raising capital from the public in
broadly the same numbers as they had in the years before the GFC. Underwriters continued
earning broadly similar underwriting fees to these years but the first day returns to
subscribing investors were on average, much lower than before the GFC. In fact they are
very close to zero. What we do not fully understand yet is why REIT IPO investors
subscribed to these IPOs (given the near zero theoretical first day returns and less than even
money chance of earning any sort of first day return at all). We do, however, find evidence
that newly listed REITs provide positive and significant abnormal dividend yields. In terms
3.07%
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4.39%
0.00%
1.00%
2.00%
3.00%
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Figure 1.
Dividend yields for
portfolio of REIT
IPOs and FTSE
NAREIT All REITs
Index from 2010
to June 2015
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of practical insights and applications, it may be that investors in REIT IPOs are not so
concerned about earning first day returns. It appears REIT IPO investors may, however,
be seeking to earn superior (compared to the broader FTSE NAREIT All REIT index)
dividend income yields in the longer term by holding these REIT IPOs.
Chasing superior yields in the post-GFC period may be a concern to many investors,
but the over 6 percent first year average dividend yields earned by REIT IPO investors
appear to be fairly useful returns indeed, given the relatively low interest rate environment.
If these superior REIT IPO dividend yields continue over longer-term (over one year)
horizons, then investors may be even more satisfied. As expressed above we see this as an
area for future investigation.
Longer-term REIT IPO performance continues to puzzle. While previous studies suggest
that longer-term total returns have been mixed, this study finds REIT IPOs have not
statistically significantly underperformed or outperformed the market.
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